TV

Thanks to the annual TV discussion board media-friendly frequented by theorists and practicians our attention has been drawn once again towards the eternal conflict between information and entertainment. In fact, televison's self-criticism seems to be focussed upon these two terms. Once a year programme managers of the diverse stations show up, magically attracted by an inviting motto such as ‚Quo vadis, journalism' and discuss the quality of TV journalism. Even the impartial observer who has been spending large amounts of his lifetime in front of the telly has meanwhile found out that the roles are clearly distributed; on the one hand the public stations, matter-of-fact, quality-oriented, sincere, senile, on the other the private stations, colourful, infantile, representative of the fun generation.
As the debate is not meant to appear too auto-referential, attention is quickly drawn towards the Invisible Third, the audience. It focuses on the feedback, that is the effects of the effects on the audience on the programme stations. Preferably, empirical research is quoted drawing the line between public and commercial TV sometimes boldly, sometimes weakly - depending on who has ordered the research.
What makes the definition difficult is how information and entertainment are related. As is mostly the case, the categories depend on the observer who nonetheless somehow tries to ignore himself, thus creating the impression they are real. But the problems strike back: How entertaining may information be without being confused with entertainment? In turn, how much information can entertainment afford without taking sides with it?
So there is a variably sized district within which entertaining gets gradually informative, information entertaining. Apart from that the definition is per se difficult because the term information is ambiguous; beside the above mentioned meaning it can also denote any content. In that sense, anything is informative and it remains to be decided after that whether that information is informative or entertaining. (That is the ironical aspect of information; it is commonly used, because it is not very informative.) But before entering the nirvana of semantics, we seize a term which expresses this dim state of equality: It is called infotainment. A (by the way nearly successful) morphological contamination of information and entertainment. Originally brought up by the commercial stations in order to break through to the domain of public information, the public stations have widely lost their inhibitions and adopted the term. Sober knowledge has turned into a trendy one. And whoever was considered to be cynical because he held his audience for dumb enough to soften up the hard facts, has transformed into a sensitive programme maker who serves the sophisticated client. As the TV competitors observe each other how they are recognized by the audience, the standards of TV aesthetics have changed on both sides: more images and PowerPoint graphics, shorter sentences with dubious grammatical justification. Entertainment has shifted from SUBTRAHENDUM to SUMMANDUM of information. We might draw the conclusion that the distinction of information and entertainment still exists, but is disposable.
In short: Informative and entertaining formats each differ in information and entertainment. Another difference (the positive respectively the negative evaluation of the issue) then causes the continuous and endless self-representation typical of programme stations. Accordingly, the informative side of the information side counts as serious, whereas the entertaining side of the entertainment side is regarded as dubious. This is for sure, for the mingled forms information/entertainment or entertainment/information are all the more shady. At this stage, the common difference public/commercial is of no more avail.
Therefore, infotainment is a cipher of uncertainty if spectator A informs, spectator B enjoys himself. Or vice versa. We might assume the term remains open to speculation and will be further distinguished after high value and low value infotainment.
Horatio would be delighted to know his formula of prodesse et delectare still causes some headscratching - today and at the next annual TV meetings.

Transitions

What a theory of culture can learn from semiotics, in particular structuralist semantics is how meaning units, especially verbal ones, are organized. We understand words carry no meaning in themselves, but only denote something because there are other words which denote different concepts. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not conveyed when we look at a specific animal, but when we are aware there is a series of other designations of animals which entirely do not fall under the concept of a dog. So in the end the meaning of the word dog is it does not designate a cat, a solitary cell or a slug.
This principle has also been discovered by second order cybernetics talking about the re-entry of a form into a form. A form consists accordingly to that view of two sides - a marked one and an unmarked one. The marked space suggests to be all-comprising even though is merely leaves the unmarked, but implied space concealed. That is why we think a dog is a dog, because it is a dog, not because it is not a rhinoceros, a locust or a brimstone.
These trivial observations are nonetheless interesting, for they are rarely reflected upon. The 'logic of distinction' establishes no revolutionarily new perspective but informs us that we cannot observe how we observe when we observe - when observing we cannot observe observation. And this kind of managing semantic distinction becomes most interesting when we do not distinguish a single term but a pair of terms - mostly one which establishes an opposition. Assuming we observe the opposition 'beautiful - ugly'; in that case we do not only distinguish that opposition as a whole (beautiful - ugly as opposed to lazy - diligent, stupid - bright, e.g.), but also, what is even more interesting, the handling of a borderline within that pair of terms. And now the question arises as to how long can we attribute a thing to the one side, let us say the beautiful, until it will cross the line leading to the realm of ugliness? In other words: how are the semantic transitions organized? What about grey tones, presupposing we do not conceive black and white as totally detached ('manichaic') oppositions but assume there are transition steps, bilateral approximations to that line?
Empirical market research has primarily tackled this question and developed a demoscopic means with which to measure evaluations in a scalar way. A frame of notions is bent between two oppositions, each representing an extreme value. The specific single case is placed within that semantic continuum. This is called Semantic Differential and should be known to unsuspected pedestrians who have ever taken part in a poll. They are asked for an evaluation - be ist of a politician, of the general situation, of a political party, of the fruit quota of a yoghurt or what ever. To that means they will be presented with a scale whose two extreme points are occupied by values such as 'active' or 'do fully agree' on the one side, 'passive' or 'do not agree at all' on the other one. These values are linked with figures ranging, say, between 0 and 7. The indivudual answers to each question will be put in a series, thus generating a profile of opinion.
As can be clearly seen, it is the middle values which are the least spectacular, but the most crucial. After all: it is quite easy to find out if someone is a gifted football player, vocalist or head of a party or a total failure. However, what exactly makes the difference between three and four points? Where exactly is the separation line of the mean value? The answer to that question is backed by no reason at all - apart from volition. We might borrow Wittgenstein's saying that there is no line - we must draw it on our own. (This might be a modest indication to all those who think fuzzy logic is only revolutionary because they have never been concerned with a criticism of language.
The value attribution has of course some effects - not only upon the evaluation object, but also on the evaluator him- or herself. For one thing, our attention is often drawn to the relevance of the evaluation by being asked to evaluate at all. For another, the variety of opinions involves one's own estimation somehow competes with others'. And sometimes we can only cope with a difference of extimations by regarding the others as ignorant or feeling induced to distinguish the public from the published values. In that case one likes to belong to the silent majority’s talking minority What does some damage to the air of exact quantity to the entire business is the way the opposition pairs establishing the differential are selected. Does a politician count as undecided in the same way if the researcher chooses careless or deliberative as oppsition terms? And is it really sufficient to inform the public only about the form side of the representative poll values? The attribute will be communicated, but not the context, the scope within the estimation reveals itself. This way the evaluation with all its consequences resembles a photograph; maybe endowed with an exemplary depth of focus, the highest possible precision which only makes us aware a photograph is just a model, a cut from a panorama whose motive is exclusively due to the respective perspective of the person who takes the picture.
Conclusively, this text calmly awaits the 0 on the evaluation scale - providing 0 denotes quite stimulating, 7 entirely stupid.

Thomas theorem

Knowledge sets the society's pulse. Its tempo, especially its chronology is based on knowledge units being put into a period. Otherwise the antique, the Middle Ages and the modern times could not be clearly distinguished. So the complexity of the cultural, but particularly scientific achievements handed down founds the imaginary human CV. Lack of knowledge is irrelevant in this conception. At best it is regarded as a transformandum to be turned into its positive opposite as quickly as possible. So lack of knowledge threatens to break off the tempo. That is why it must be quickly redefined as merely interrupting the temporal structure - this is expensive enough.
As we do not possess universal objective knowledge anymore (and by now have quit even wanting to possess it, since we have gained some gradual insight into the problems the Creator has to tackle), we have invented a construction which helps us convert lack of knowledge into knowledge by all means: the belief that we know something. Now, at the moment of deciding, under time pressure, we need not care for what might later turn out to be an error. Only this makes organizing companies, offices, governments, clubs or families possible. Functionally speaking it makes no difference if we really know something or only suppose we do. The only thing that matters is that we bring about a decision conscious of knowing - regardless how deceptive that might be. That there is knowledge is a helpful fiction to motivate ourselves to go on - to avoid surrendering to all the impediments we can or cannot imagine. Which means: Stating facts creates them..
Exchangeability means the borders between knowledge and belief are bilaterally pervious. It is merley a useful fiction which feigns to us there is an osmotic relationship - only knowledge could influence belief. Actually the reverse option is possible, too. Belief creates knowledge; both brainworks diffuse.
Under the label Thomas theorem this aspect entered the history of social research. It says the consequences of a situation which is only regarded to be real will inevitably turn out to be real - even if the situation itself will prove to be irreal, its estimation to be wrong. This is according to the theorem's founder, William I. Thomas. By the way, it is only by accident that the NT scepticist Thomas could have found it, too - if people really believe water can be turned into wine, they will behave so - they will get the Holy Inquisition onto those who refuse to set alleged witches on fire.
What saves the theorem from being a mere footnote in the history of culture resp. science is that it is so practical. It is apparent every day (and not only in this text which contains ideas the author wrongly considers to be correct.) The theorem is so to speak the functional free ticket for rumours of any kind. For gossip cannot be checked either, which does not contain their spreading at all. Assuming we greet a new neighbour whose lack of sociability will soon cause the wildest speculations. Above all, he might have something to hide - for instance, when he after a short nod in the staircase quickly takes to his heels. (That he just might want to catch his bus will soon be crossed out from the list of posiible explanations.) Sooner or later the rumour can make its own choice, so to speak, if the neighbour makes a career in the drug dealing, slave trading or child abusing genre.
As we can see: It is exactly avoiding communication which founds rumours. One has something to talk about, and if someone does not submit to that need, one can speculate and make up topics. Communication needs information - regardlessly if they are true or not. The same construction applies to stock exchange - probably the biggest information trading centre. A little tip here, a (dis)approving clicking of the tongue there when it comes to estimating if enterprise data is exact, and speculation is off and running. The current price indicates rumour. The fact that every participant, including the interested public, knows that, makes no difference at all. For refutation of a rumour might be a rumour itself.
So rumours are indifferent to truth. At best we can try to grade them with reference to the artificial criterion of probability (providing we do not consider the use statistics has to be a rumour). Past rumours which have been recognized as such are called legends. Those which still claim to be valid are called prejudice. Rumours concerning the future are either called forecast (on condition they are more probable) or prophety (on condition they are less probable). Present rumours are either called gossip or propaganda (if we wish to reveal them) or information. Rumours concerning a person are called reputation, image - if we spread them about ourselves or acceptance - if they are spread about us-.
The success formula of rumours refers to their amazing flexibility; they are dependent on human disseminators, it is true, but this is it. Whatever a rumour recipient consciously or unconsciously makes up additionally can be absorbed and integrated into the rumour. It works along the same line as the Invisible Hand which doe not care at all what human beings will do, as long as they do something at all. Or do not. Therefore, misunderstandings when receiving and transporting rumours will not torpedo their effect. Quite the contrary, they are an integrated system fault to prevent the system from failing, endogenous antibodies which saves the rumour from uncomplicated refutation.
Rumours especially thrive within the political realm. This is due to the respective politicians falling victim to their own rumour they are all cunning strategists. That is why we always expect an ulterior motive behind any statement. Whoever tries to tackle a rumour will soon be regarded the craftiest strategist. And it is exactly that constellation which allows to combine entirely contradictory single rumours to extensive bundles, even conspiracy theories. Even the most heterogeneous components will not thwart that complex - on the contrary, they will back it. Just in that improbable concurrence the media paranoiac aka the public will discover a conclusive logic which actually is compulsive. Immunity to contradiction results from holding it to be a rumour the opposite side has insiduously, strategically disseminated.
Consipiracy theories are probably booming because the way they are organized is that up to date: a complex consisting of elements (in this case claims) loosely strung together, a rhizome, a network without central control, beginning and ending. A flabby something, extraordinary flexible, indestructible. What distinguishes them from mere fiction, though is their claim to be real. This claim serves to transform improbability into truth - suddenly we seem to justly assume what is unjustified.

Theory & Practice

People facing complexity either resort to a state of defiant boredom or desolation - the attitude of 'Makes no difference' or 'There is no use to it'. When we reflect upon why complexity is that frustrating, we will soon discover an insufficent concept manegement. For usually human beings follow the digital example and adjust their world view to strictly two-valued notions: rational - emotional, single - married, stupid - bright, successful - scholar. But in doing so, they do not differentiate the conncetion between these two concepts, but incidentally assume a contradictory relation - just like the black and white pattern. Either something will be A or B. And nothing else.
But as classical logic teaches us these two-sided relations create different kinds of oppositions. And the author cannot quit suspecting the frustrating thing about complexity is people wrongly assume there is only a contradictory relation. In other words: when people must realize the one preferred value is intricately connected with the rejected counterpart. Sustainability, for instance, from that point of view means we hope for time development which will reveal this connection. For that reason people sometimes spend money so that they can earn it.
That kind of complexity is indicated by paradox. If X and Y are oppositions and we wish to achieve X, then it will be absurd to aim at Y - at least this is what we think. But, as has been pointed out, there actually are instances we will exactly have to do that.
A similar oposition pair discussed ad nauseam concerns theory and practice. Here the boundaries run virtually institutionally, namely at the university and factory halls with each drawing the line between the theoretical and the practical world. Border crossers are roaringly invited now and then, ist is true, but they will scrape up to the end of days at the gates of the alien world. This is because in the end both sides are afraid the visitor from outside might seize the opportunity to speak and disturb the routine they have grown very fond of. If someone in the theoretical realm deos without certain words in certain situations, he or she will be exposed to contempt just the way if he or she does use them within the practical realm. Along the university and factory gates words shimmer between technical terms and double Dutch.
This difference is comfortable enough to arouse suspicion. Which is to say it is justified, but insufficiently backed. After all, it might be worth a minute of thinking if it is not so much the lack of practice, but the unsatisfactory theoretical orientation which makes the theorists think they can make nothing of practice. In turn, it might be rewarding, too, to think if the practical persons do not rather cherish an empirical, not a theoretical blind spot. For if we assume that Immanuel Kant, who has been recently been done the honour of being remembered, really was bright, then we ought to remember he settled the quarrel between theory and practice more than 200 years ago. In those days the theoretists called themselves rationalists, the practical persons empirists. As Kant pointed out, theory without practice is void, just as practice without theory is blind. Which means that theory will have failed to reflect suffiently upon practice if it can only be theoretically practical - while practice so far has deprived itself of the practical opportunity to incorporate theoretical knwoledge into action.
Thinking very practically (or acting very analytically) will help us to relaize how absurd that concept management really is - every theorists will always be a practical person and the other way round. This is because theory and practice form complementary terms controlling each other. We do something and see (Ancient Greek: theorein) what happens so that we can do something again so that we can see what happens so that we can do something and so on. Even the theorist in the flesh will know someone to deliver his food into his ivory tower, and even the most radical practical person has a certain notion of what he is doing - beyond the single case.
All in all, the trench quarrels between the self-styled theorists and practical persons know only one winner: mediocrity. In the long run it will jeopardy both sides - the theorists because one day they are bound to practically experience research budgets from the practice are missing, the practical persons because one day they will tehoretically understand why they are not competitive anymore.

Tertium comparationis

Imagine that we had 100 black and 100 white balls, 100 black cubes and 3 caskets. Further imagine that someone showed up and offered to establish some order. Genrously we beat a retreat and spent our time doing something more important. A little later our asistant informs us radiantly the utensils were stowed away in the caskets. Let us finally assume we took a look and recoiled. Against our expectations the first casket contains 99 white balls and 1 black one. In the second casket 99 black balls and 1 black cube sneer. Casket No. 3 of course holds the 99 black cubes and 1 white ball. The order, where is it, we might ask. It is simple, the assistant tells us with blank looks, in the first casket there are balls, in the second one black objects, in the third one geometrical solids. Anybody can see that.
Why is that procedure more irritating than simply filling the caskets in an indiscriminate way? Perhaps because dissolving the expected unities has initiated a goal-directed, in other words: not an accidental recombination. Irrespectively how artificial the procedure might seem - it is not arbitrary. It merely prefers a solution which is surprising to one that is conventional. It establishes an abstract connection between the casket contents which is nonetheless creative and well-founded. Leaving aside the problem if such a solution might be a little too sophisticated for the creators of these marvellous intelligence tests (so that it will not be rewarded with any point at all), the categories regulating the assignment are worth having a closer look at.
The point of any order is based on common things in a unit A as opposed to common things of a unit B. Elements turn into structural units by being attributed (at least) 1 common quality. The more obvious the things in common are, the more natural order appears to be. However, as our little example demonstrates, there is no natural order apart from the one who establishes it. E.g., organisms can be distinguished from unanimated elements; within the organisms human beings can be separated from animals, women from men, militant feminists from house crickets, machos from softies etc. Any identification which precedes establishing categories is based on comparing (at least) two independent units which nonetheless share from a certain point of view a quality, an attribution. Both A and B have c. The Latin expression is tertium comparationis - the third of a comparison. However, since classical logic does not like to count beyond three (tertium non datur), often identifying is identified with comparing. But this is not precise enough, for the two elements are only exchangable within the preselected scope of comparison. A and B are only identical with reference to c; apart from that they can differ like fire and water (which are identical concerning their being elements). As a consequence, not only identifying, but also distinguishing relies on a comparison under a certain aspect. The other way round, one can neglect c and concentrate on d as the standard of comparison, which might only A, but not B possess, which might justify allocating A and B to different units.
In other words: Comparisons are ambivalent. With reference to them two elements can either be attributed to the same category or to two different frameworks. Usually we do both at the same time, but we restrict ourselves either to the separating or the identifying aspects. This goes for things which are seemingly impossible to compare, for even this requires comparing.
Now this might sound like semantic hairsplitting, but sometimes has serious consequences in public discourse. Especially in Germany there is an almost annual ritual of blaming somebody for blaming somebody to be like a Third Reich person. Take for instance the former German Minister of Justice, who was accused of having identified the present President of God's Own Country with the Führer two years ago. The public turmoil was considerable and cost her her position. Under the media conditions the resignment was entirely justified, for nobody takes pains over quoting controversial statements in full wording anymore, but is content with elliptical condensation forms such as Minister: President is Führer. Luckily enough, all that took place while the German parliament election campaign was reaching its peak, so that venom could foam richly. But nonetheless: comparing is not identifying. A comparison just might entail an identification. Most prominent Nazis were like the author endowed with two fully working feet. From that perspective it would be correct to put him and them into the same category; from many other ones it would not,
Are we to conclude the entire scandal was only a malicious misunderstanding of a certain kind of politically biased media? Not entirely, for mostly we expect the standard of comparison to be in away relevant, informative. And it is that person making a comparison who is responsible for its relevance - even if it is impossible, because somone might recognize a kind of relevance which might not have been intended. In this case it has just been presupposed the relevant standard of comparison was the same kind of worthlessness.
A similar thing goes for the term offender nation; since we can suppose it will be far more informative to find a wholly peaceful nation we are bound to wonder why Germans and Jews? Israelis? are compared by that standard. Even if he emphasizes he does not intend to identify them. And therefore it is totally legitimate to compare him by that standard with a cowardly revisionist - after all he is not automatically identified with such a person. Providing differences remain to be found. But this is a question of willpower. After all, we cannot boast of tackling a hot issue and consequently lament we are being accused of having broken a taboo.

Target group

With visions it is quite a matter apart; quite a few people were seized by them and got celebrated for creating a new reality. Others were not able to draw a clear line between them and illusionary hallucinations and had to pay for it. Sometimes the transitions are fluent - from the Super Man to someone who embraces a carriage horse. But nowadays the matters are clear: Having a vision means having to see a doctor. We are too rational for that, are we not? We prefer relying on reasoned goals which do not remain in the sphere of metaphysical vagueness but pay tribute to cold calculation.
Apart from their psychiatric harmlessness, goals have the advantage over visions that they can be inserted into a chain of action. No sooner have they dissolved, they can be reinterperted as a means for a further goal. They can be recombined. As opposed to visions they give practice a structure. Visions in contrast make the invisible process. But however manifest goals may be; perfidity can be relied on; for goals require concentration, and they are relative. Goal conflicts can occur, and even the most ambitious plans might shrink into the hope to come out of it unscathed.
Let us take for instance the Marketing and the Public Relations Department of a company. Harmonious cooperation does not seem quite to be the phrase. The conflict of goals is caused by the fact that both departments will do two different jigsaw puzzles - except for one crucial element claimed by each department for itself: the target group, or, to be more precise, the divergent ideas that are associated with it.
From a marketing point of view, target groups are commercial persons to turn to, customers in short. As opposed to that, PR strategists identify target groups with the public. The difficulty is that the set of intersection is not considerable enough to reconcile marketing and PR. To put it oversubtly: Even in case one is neither acquiring customers nor winning the public opinion marketing and PR remain clearly detached, for their original Reason of Being is competing with each other. Maybe because they are tired of the constant quarreling over budgets and workrooms, senior executives like to talk about Integrated Corporate Communications and shake the marketing mix. Thus convinced of their intelligence they cooperatively lean back and allow the opponents to keep plotting and scheming against each other.
So we see target groups is a misleading term suggesting they are homogeneous social strata. But not only target group I, II, III etc. differ, but it is even unclear what makes a single target group. Of course we can formally resort to demography - but who would really dare consider the 24-49 year old people, men and women, unemployed and pensioners to be a united group? So we continue specifying and parcelling out new target part-groups, e.g. the female start up company founders with cellulitis and a latent desire for babies or the football fans who boldly drive a car while they are drunk. Social change (or its expectation) goes out of the way. Like political parties companies' chances to serve regulars are decreasing. New markets and voters must be developed, old ones are to be said goodbye to till they will be greeted lateron as the new ones. So the dynamics of goal-making adds up to the revolving door effect: Today's non-target groups must now be courted as tomorrow's target groups.
It is left to PR to do the impossible; for the target groups are as different and contradictory as the part-goals. They embody the fundamental difference between an information and a message, between what is said and what is meant, between intended addressee and collateral recipient. What is meant to please a special target group, just will not apply to the rest of the public; at best it will remain indifferent. Where growth is said, elsewhere pollution, social frigidity or scandal is understood. And at worst public attention is generated because one cannot do justice to everybody. Compassion will be missing. Therefore chief bankers' statements will cause only their their peers' ovations, but catcalls from the outside.
Corporate communications can tell a thing or two about it; it is about the shareholders and the stakeholders - the investors, brokers and speculators on the one side, the residents, the environmentalists, the trade unions on the other one. PR have reacted in a traditionally modern way, distributed the trouble and outsourced the Investor Relations. Now the boundary has been cemented. Who gives to whom when what information about what decision with what consequences with what intention? If no differences are made, the more important target groups will feel offended; if a difference is made, the other groups will feel alarmed, which can undermine credibility and jeopardize the existence of the company as well. In the end, everybody will dissatisfied.
Why target-groups are still stuck to? Well, for one thing the unknown must be given a name, and for another the creative aspects of finding target-groups can even be extended: We invent our own ones. Especially media programmes that are privately financed prove their TV viewers are modern YUPPIE layers disporting themselves at after work parties and making self-trivilization a way of life until they will be made redundant in their end thirties, too. These persons confuse being individual with being a member of that imaginary target-group. But it is in particular the political parties which pursue the target-groups most resolutely: As they are deemed to please everybody and to blame the smaller competitors for mere clientele policy, their public statements must reach that exact degree of semantic vagueness which just detaches twaddle from majority acceptability. As the political chat shows teach us, the scope is gradually shrinking.

Sustainability

As we all know, they are existent - these keywords putting the social state of the art in a nutshell; annoyance belongs to them as well as fear, risk and irrelevance. All in all, these terms are a bit unpleasant, which disqualifies them for the have some fun and pay-slogans. Above all, they express no perspective dimensionality, but simply lament the present state.
Quite different is the case with another keyword: sustainability. As far as the author is informed, it has not entered into common vocabulary till the last 12 years. What makes it that interesting is his pardoxical construction, the contradiction between word content and use. Without doubt, it is a fashionable term which objects fashion trends. Sustainability implies austerity, circumspection, foresight, a sense of responsibilty, in short everything which is missing all the time. Especially today.
It is similarly paradoxical it is just the political elite, led by our head of government, the media chancellor, uses this term as if it was a matter of course. Just like the top managers he compliantly practices self-contradiction in action, for on modern public conditions there is no sustainable use of the word sustainability.
Sustainability is endowed with a deontic component of meaning; the term expresses an obligation, and it is very telling it had its breakthrough at one of these effectless world climate conferences. And just because they have no effects, the deontic component constantly gains splendour. The admonishing index is growing and growing.
The original idea of sustainability is an economic one - if we naively presusppose keeping house is coping with a lack. So sustainable economy is in principle a pleonasm like the notorious female woman, little dwarf or corrupt politician. But the fact sustainability counts as relevant instead of redundant is obviously due to waste as an end in itself. Above all it is the environmental resources whose waste has been causing voluptuous scenarios of distribution wars, but there is information, patience, intelligence, too. Everybody knwos we cannot go on like that, foresees the bill subsequent generations will have to pay. Therefore the term is used once more. a real invocation formula which seems to be meant to exorcize the demons of future shortcomings.
The issue of sustainability, its lasting relevance for social discourse, is based on the foolish dealing with scarcity. As the spiral continues turning, everything is running shorter and shorter faster and faster. And here lies the real, typically modern reason, for while former societies knew the problem of short goods, too, nowadays time itself is a short good, too. Less time is due to making faster and faster decisions, for everybody is running the risk of being forestalled by someone - someone who did not produce new blood or who simply has better nerves. In other words: someone unscrupulous - a tough, rational manager. Someone who will be capable of selling charterflights to the Mars as soon as the Earth will have completely been exploited. Impressive, is it not?
Of course we shall have to pose the question whether there is something that can be done in a sustained way at all. It is not accidental in the least this idea has been transferred into eternity, metaphysical. There is an air of modesty behind it the present show-offish technocrats can only despise. Who can tell anyway whether the expectations will become real? And how sustained is sustained? Which means, how long is the expected period of time during which the intended sustainability is meant to last? Temporal complexity, the acceleration involves nowadays we can only conceive sustainability as a breather which interrupts the staccato-like managing mania. This is something we ought not to leave aside, for otherwise we will confuse sustainability with making only one (albeit the right one) decision so that we can live after that till the end of all days contently and unmolestedly. Since this apparently does not work (as has been said above, risk is another keyword), annoyance and disappointment will spread all the more. Better, we will not do anything. Then we can make no mistakes. And that means any. Till then we can continue talking about sustainability. Maybe we can take some consolation from the fact desasters produce the most sustained states we can imagine.