In the last few years the public has been discussing the psychological effects of power; psychologically trained by TV we attest politicians a craving for it. They in turn seem to see no option but to initiate a semantic bargaining, trying to replace the word power by the word arrangement. Media tragedies with fallen politicians go out of one's way. The will for power seems to have entirely converted into the addiction to power. This might be largely due to the fact that lapses in fact and character are all too visible, but hardly lead to resignation. Thus it is deduced no politician, no leading industrialist, no head of union, no headmaster is ready to bear the consequences. For that reason power appears to have become a mere end in itself.
Above all, this is because power - after the interlude of civil public - has by now become a single term again by having banished its temporary equivalent repsonsibility far into the collective subconsciousness. The state of Absolutism has almost returned. Induced by the notion of God's mercy no public dicourse on the division of power had been possible. All that could be done - in case the ruler was particularly incompetent - was to send less pious prayers to heaven to get rid of that human kind of natural desaster - or to fill quite a surprising substance into the winetumbler.
With enlightenment prevailing power was no longer transcendentally justified, but immediately coupled with the ruler's behaviour. The bigger his power, the bigger his responsibility. So responsibility served as a kind of reservoir of unknown sanctions impending the failing ruler in case he misused his power. In other words: responsibility is an installed memento mori within the office.
This mnemonic aid, however, can only work if memory is remembered. But this is no more a matter of course. The influentials' amnesia is much too often publically supported. But even in case someone did draw a conclusion this will not necessarily mean the end of the power career. For they are so rare we are almost inclined to pay respect to a person who has testified his loss of respect by resigning. Such a person will probably be granted a certain period of time for self-knowledge and reformation until he will reappear on the list of potentially powerful people. It is only dubious how much time he will be granted. This is because the modern understanding of responsibility is ambiguous, for the present-day society sharply distinguishes between responsibility and guilt. And responsibility in its modern form cannot dispense with specialization and division of labour within increasingly complex administration units. The Minister can always affirm solemnly he did not know anything at all about the apalling affair, and what seems to be incompetent today will be tomorrow regarded a liberal way of leadership - when the successor comes under fire himself. After all - everybody will approve of liberal leadership. Therefore any resignment is accomanied by the defiant or melancholy protestation. This might not even be that false. We must not forget the social function of a leading position (along with its salary) is just creating personal address stations in that impersonal system, thus creating at least the impression of responsibility.
What makes modern power that problematic is it is no longer necessarily linked with influence. Their sources have been separated. In the past both power and influence were based on repect for certain personages. Pure unadulterated respect means attributing grandeur for the benefit of the respected person. We can here rely on Kant, whose definition of grandeur is still excellent. According to him, grandeur mingles two different moods, namely admiration and fear. Sublime persons therefore do not diffuse terror, because they are consiciously admired, that is the admirer is allowed to form a positive judgement about them. This is what makes their influence. So influence also implies direct perception. For that reason it is characterized by social groups on principle of manageable size. In case someone was influential enough, it was possible this good was officially, so to speak, made a vested right, formally attested – by status symbols, rituals, solemn ceremonies. And at that precise moment the influential had turned into a powerful person. So according to this classical view power directly results from influence. And for that reason both influence and power link admiration and fear in the form of respect. If I have to accept someone makes my decisions, he at least ought to be the approprate person. So the terms influence and responsibility correlate.
If only because the small group model cannot be applied anymore to the entire society, influence and power do not go together. Politicians are considered to be powerful, but the ordinary citizens mistrust them. The share of admiration of the respect for the powerful is decreasing – by now it has become so obvious that the German public is speaking about disaffection towards politicians, not politics. Influence (with reagrds to power) seems to be a mere back room event with snappy lobbyists pulling a fast one on the mob, securing a privileged access into the powerful’s ear (or an alternative orifice). For that reason the powerful do not seem to act for the common good’s, only for the partial interest’s sake.
Of course someone might raise the objection there have always been persons exerting influence on the powerful. Take for instance the feudal era with its court advisors, skillful schemers, Machiavellis, nimble flatterers portrayed in the German Baroque literature or in Lessings’s tragedies. But there remains an important difference, for nowadays the lobbyists do not even have to arouse the impression their future depends on the powerful’s success. It is not for nothing they are endowed with two feet they can put both into the goverment’s and the opposition’s doors.
Above all, this is because power - after the interlude of civil public - has by now become a single term again by having banished its temporary equivalent repsonsibility far into the collective subconsciousness. The state of Absolutism has almost returned. Induced by the notion of God's mercy no public dicourse on the division of power had been possible. All that could be done - in case the ruler was particularly incompetent - was to send less pious prayers to heaven to get rid of that human kind of natural desaster - or to fill quite a surprising substance into the winetumbler.
With enlightenment prevailing power was no longer transcendentally justified, but immediately coupled with the ruler's behaviour. The bigger his power, the bigger his responsibility. So responsibility served as a kind of reservoir of unknown sanctions impending the failing ruler in case he misused his power. In other words: responsibility is an installed memento mori within the office.
This mnemonic aid, however, can only work if memory is remembered. But this is no more a matter of course. The influentials' amnesia is much too often publically supported. But even in case someone did draw a conclusion this will not necessarily mean the end of the power career. For they are so rare we are almost inclined to pay respect to a person who has testified his loss of respect by resigning. Such a person will probably be granted a certain period of time for self-knowledge and reformation until he will reappear on the list of potentially powerful people. It is only dubious how much time he will be granted. This is because the modern understanding of responsibility is ambiguous, for the present-day society sharply distinguishes between responsibility and guilt. And responsibility in its modern form cannot dispense with specialization and division of labour within increasingly complex administration units. The Minister can always affirm solemnly he did not know anything at all about the apalling affair, and what seems to be incompetent today will be tomorrow regarded a liberal way of leadership - when the successor comes under fire himself. After all - everybody will approve of liberal leadership. Therefore any resignment is accomanied by the defiant or melancholy protestation. This might not even be that false. We must not forget the social function of a leading position (along with its salary) is just creating personal address stations in that impersonal system, thus creating at least the impression of responsibility.
What makes modern power that problematic is it is no longer necessarily linked with influence. Their sources have been separated. In the past both power and influence were based on repect for certain personages. Pure unadulterated respect means attributing grandeur for the benefit of the respected person. We can here rely on Kant, whose definition of grandeur is still excellent. According to him, grandeur mingles two different moods, namely admiration and fear. Sublime persons therefore do not diffuse terror, because they are consiciously admired, that is the admirer is allowed to form a positive judgement about them. This is what makes their influence. So influence also implies direct perception. For that reason it is characterized by social groups on principle of manageable size. In case someone was influential enough, it was possible this good was officially, so to speak, made a vested right, formally attested – by status symbols, rituals, solemn ceremonies. And at that precise moment the influential had turned into a powerful person. So according to this classical view power directly results from influence. And for that reason both influence and power link admiration and fear in the form of respect. If I have to accept someone makes my decisions, he at least ought to be the approprate person. So the terms influence and responsibility correlate.
If only because the small group model cannot be applied anymore to the entire society, influence and power do not go together. Politicians are considered to be powerful, but the ordinary citizens mistrust them. The share of admiration of the respect for the powerful is decreasing – by now it has become so obvious that the German public is speaking about disaffection towards politicians, not politics. Influence (with reagrds to power) seems to be a mere back room event with snappy lobbyists pulling a fast one on the mob, securing a privileged access into the powerful’s ear (or an alternative orifice). For that reason the powerful do not seem to act for the common good’s, only for the partial interest’s sake.
Of course someone might raise the objection there have always been persons exerting influence on the powerful. Take for instance the feudal era with its court advisors, skillful schemers, Machiavellis, nimble flatterers portrayed in the German Baroque literature or in Lessings’s tragedies. But there remains an important difference, for nowadays the lobbyists do not even have to arouse the impression their future depends on the powerful’s success. It is not for nothing they are endowed with two feet they can put both into the goverment’s and the opposition’s doors.
No comments:
Post a Comment