Monday 19 January 2009

Tertium comparationis

Imagine that we had 100 black and 100 white balls, 100 black cubes and 3 caskets. Further imagine that someone showed up and offered to establish some order. Genrously we beat a retreat and spent our time doing something more important. A little later our asistant informs us radiantly the utensils were stowed away in the caskets. Let us finally assume we took a look and recoiled. Against our expectations the first casket contains 99 white balls and 1 black one. In the second casket 99 black balls and 1 black cube sneer. Casket No. 3 of course holds the 99 black cubes and 1 white ball. The order, where is it, we might ask. It is simple, the assistant tells us with blank looks, in the first casket there are balls, in the second one black objects, in the third one geometrical solids. Anybody can see that.
Why is that procedure more irritating than simply filling the caskets in an indiscriminate way? Perhaps because dissolving the expected unities has initiated a goal-directed, in other words: not an accidental recombination. Irrespectively how artificial the procedure might seem - it is not arbitrary. It merely prefers a solution which is surprising to one that is conventional. It establishes an abstract connection between the casket contents which is nonetheless creative and well-founded. Leaving aside the problem if such a solution might be a little too sophisticated for the creators of these marvellous intelligence tests (so that it will not be rewarded with any point at all), the categories regulating the assignment are worth having a closer look at.
The point of any order is based on common things in a unit A as opposed to common things of a unit B. Elements turn into structural units by being attributed (at least) 1 common quality. The more obvious the things in common are, the more natural order appears to be. However, as our little example demonstrates, there is no natural order apart from the one who establishes it. E.g., organisms can be distinguished from unanimated elements; within the organisms human beings can be separated from animals, women from men, militant feminists from house crickets, machos from softies etc. Any identification which precedes establishing categories is based on comparing (at least) two independent units which nonetheless share from a certain point of view a quality, an attribution. Both A and B have c. The Latin expression is tertium comparationis - the third of a comparison. However, since classical logic does not like to count beyond three (tertium non datur), often identifying is identified with comparing. But this is not precise enough, for the two elements are only exchangable within the preselected scope of comparison. A and B are only identical with reference to c; apart from that they can differ like fire and water (which are identical concerning their being elements). As a consequence, not only identifying, but also distinguishing relies on a comparison under a certain aspect. The other way round, one can neglect c and concentrate on d as the standard of comparison, which might only A, but not B possess, which might justify allocating A and B to different units.
In other words: Comparisons are ambivalent. With reference to them two elements can either be attributed to the same category or to two different frameworks. Usually we do both at the same time, but we restrict ourselves either to the separating or the identifying aspects. This goes for things which are seemingly impossible to compare, for even this requires comparing.
Now this might sound like semantic hairsplitting, but sometimes has serious consequences in public discourse. Especially in Germany there is an almost annual ritual of blaming somebody for blaming somebody to be like a Third Reich person. Take for instance the former German Minister of Justice, who was accused of having identified the present President of God's Own Country with the Führer two years ago. The public turmoil was considerable and cost her her position. Under the media conditions the resignment was entirely justified, for nobody takes pains over quoting controversial statements in full wording anymore, but is content with elliptical condensation forms such as Minister: President is Führer. Luckily enough, all that took place while the German parliament election campaign was reaching its peak, so that venom could foam richly. But nonetheless: comparing is not identifying. A comparison just might entail an identification. Most prominent Nazis were like the author endowed with two fully working feet. From that perspective it would be correct to put him and them into the same category; from many other ones it would not,
Are we to conclude the entire scandal was only a malicious misunderstanding of a certain kind of politically biased media? Not entirely, for mostly we expect the standard of comparison to be in away relevant, informative. And it is that person making a comparison who is responsible for its relevance - even if it is impossible, because somone might recognize a kind of relevance which might not have been intended. In this case it has just been presupposed the relevant standard of comparison was the same kind of worthlessness.
A similar thing goes for the term offender nation; since we can suppose it will be far more informative to find a wholly peaceful nation we are bound to wonder why Germans and Jews? Israelis? are compared by that standard. Even if he emphasizes he does not intend to identify them. And therefore it is totally legitimate to compare him by that standard with a cowardly revisionist - after all he is not automatically identified with such a person. Providing differences remain to be found. But this is a question of willpower. After all, we cannot boast of tackling a hot issue and consequently lament we are being accused of having broken a taboo.

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