Thursday 22 January 2009

Transitions

What a theory of culture can learn from semiotics, in particular structuralist semantics is how meaning units, especially verbal ones, are organized. We understand words carry no meaning in themselves, but only denote something because there are other words which denote different concepts. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not conveyed when we look at a specific animal, but when we are aware there is a series of other designations of animals which entirely do not fall under the concept of a dog. So in the end the meaning of the word dog is it does not designate a cat, a solitary cell or a slug.
This principle has also been discovered by second order cybernetics talking about the re-entry of a form into a form. A form consists accordingly to that view of two sides - a marked one and an unmarked one. The marked space suggests to be all-comprising even though is merely leaves the unmarked, but implied space concealed. That is why we think a dog is a dog, because it is a dog, not because it is not a rhinoceros, a locust or a brimstone.
These trivial observations are nonetheless interesting, for they are rarely reflected upon. The 'logic of distinction' establishes no revolutionarily new perspective but informs us that we cannot observe how we observe when we observe - when observing we cannot observe observation. And this kind of managing semantic distinction becomes most interesting when we do not distinguish a single term but a pair of terms - mostly one which establishes an opposition. Assuming we observe the opposition 'beautiful - ugly'; in that case we do not only distinguish that opposition as a whole (beautiful - ugly as opposed to lazy - diligent, stupid - bright, e.g.), but also, what is even more interesting, the handling of a borderline within that pair of terms. And now the question arises as to how long can we attribute a thing to the one side, let us say the beautiful, until it will cross the line leading to the realm of ugliness? In other words: how are the semantic transitions organized? What about grey tones, presupposing we do not conceive black and white as totally detached ('manichaic') oppositions but assume there are transition steps, bilateral approximations to that line?
Empirical market research has primarily tackled this question and developed a demoscopic means with which to measure evaluations in a scalar way. A frame of notions is bent between two oppositions, each representing an extreme value. The specific single case is placed within that semantic continuum. This is called Semantic Differential and should be known to unsuspected pedestrians who have ever taken part in a poll. They are asked for an evaluation - be ist of a politician, of the general situation, of a political party, of the fruit quota of a yoghurt or what ever. To that means they will be presented with a scale whose two extreme points are occupied by values such as 'active' or 'do fully agree' on the one side, 'passive' or 'do not agree at all' on the other one. These values are linked with figures ranging, say, between 0 and 7. The indivudual answers to each question will be put in a series, thus generating a profile of opinion.
As can be clearly seen, it is the middle values which are the least spectacular, but the most crucial. After all: it is quite easy to find out if someone is a gifted football player, vocalist or head of a party or a total failure. However, what exactly makes the difference between three and four points? Where exactly is the separation line of the mean value? The answer to that question is backed by no reason at all - apart from volition. We might borrow Wittgenstein's saying that there is no line - we must draw it on our own. (This might be a modest indication to all those who think fuzzy logic is only revolutionary because they have never been concerned with a criticism of language.
The value attribution has of course some effects - not only upon the evaluation object, but also on the evaluator him- or herself. For one thing, our attention is often drawn to the relevance of the evaluation by being asked to evaluate at all. For another, the variety of opinions involves one's own estimation somehow competes with others'. And sometimes we can only cope with a difference of extimations by regarding the others as ignorant or feeling induced to distinguish the public from the published values. In that case one likes to belong to the silent majority’s talking minority What does some damage to the air of exact quantity to the entire business is the way the opposition pairs establishing the differential are selected. Does a politician count as undecided in the same way if the researcher chooses careless or deliberative as oppsition terms? And is it really sufficient to inform the public only about the form side of the representative poll values? The attribute will be communicated, but not the context, the scope within the estimation reveals itself. This way the evaluation with all its consequences resembles a photograph; maybe endowed with an exemplary depth of focus, the highest possible precision which only makes us aware a photograph is just a model, a cut from a panorama whose motive is exclusively due to the respective perspective of the person who takes the picture.
Conclusively, this text calmly awaits the 0 on the evaluation scale - providing 0 denotes quite stimulating, 7 entirely stupid.

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